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RISK OF FATAL REAR-END COLLISIONS: IS THERE MORE  
TO IT THAN ATTENTION?  
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Human Factors Division 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute 
2901 Baxter Road 
Ann Arbor, Michigan,USA  
E-mail: jsully@umich.edu 
 
Summary: Rear-end collisions predominantly occur in the daytime under 
clear, unobstructed viewing conditions and usually involve a lead vehicle that 
is stopped at the time of collision. These facts suggest that driver inattention 
plays a significant causal role in rear-end collisions, and mitigation efforts 
have therefore focused largely on development of warning technologies to 
alert drivers of an impending crash. However, we note that this pattern of 
crash data should not lead to the conclusion that drivers have special difficulty 
avoiding rear-end collisions in broad daylight. Nor should it be concluded that 
other “environmental” factors do not influence driving behavior to increase 
rear-end crash risk. Crash frequency is determined both by the inherent risk in 
the driving task and by the frequency of driver exposure to conditions in 
which a crash is possible. When exposure level is equated across conditions 
which differ in ambient light level, we find that rear-end collisions appear to 
be more than twice as likely in darkness than in daylight. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the NHTSA’s General Estimates System, in 2001 there were an estimated 1.9 
million police-reported rear-end crashes in the United States, representing about 30% of a total 
of 6.3 million crashes. In contrast, rear-end crashes comprised only about 5% of all fatal crashes 
in 2001, suggesting that while numerous, rear-end crashes are not especially lethal. Nonetheless, 
rear-end crashes represent a considerable national cost and there is keen interest in developing 
effective countermeasures for this type of crash.   
A detailed breakdown of the causal analysis of crash data taken from the Indiana Tri-Level Study 
(Treat et al., 1979) suggested that, especially for circumstances in which the lead vehicle is 
stopped (LVS), the majority of rear-end collisions (approximately 68%) are caused by driver 
inattention or distraction (Knipling, Wang, & Yin, 1993). This analysis was further supported by 
a follow-up causal analysis of the 1991 National Accident Sampling System (NASS) 
Crashworthiness Data System (CDS) in which driver inattention was implicated in 66.3% 
(weighted) of the rear-end crashes (Knipling, Mironer et al., 1993). Notably, factors related to 
environmental conditions (icy roads, fog, rain, obscured vision) appeared to play only a small 
causal role. Less than 10% of the Tri-Level cases, and less than 4% of weighted cases taken from 
the analysis of the 1991 CDS data, were attributed to environmental conditions. The apparently 
strong causal relationship between driver inattention and rear-end collision also appeared to be 
further supported by the fact that 76.5% of rear-end collisions occurred in daylight and 90% 
occurred on straight roadways (Knipling, Wang et al., 1993).  Thus, the striking drivers in rear-
end crashes appear to be profoundly unaware of their immediate peril despite the generally 
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favorable environmental conditions. Mitigation efforts have thus focused largely on the 
development of warning technologies to alert drivers of impending crashes.   
Care should be taken not to over-interpret these crash facts and draw conclusions from them 
about the role of human attention. For example, it should not be concluded that inattentiveness is 
more common during the daytime on straight roads. Instead, it must be recognized that there are 
more opportunities for rear-end collisions during the daytime and on straight roadways. Rear-end 
collisions occur between a minimum of two vehicles: often one following another down a 
roadway at relatively close proximity. This circumstance is obviously less likely to occur at 
03:00 h than at 17:00 h. Thus traffic density surely contributes to the observed pattern of rear-
end crashes and should not be mistaken for drivers’ attentional processes. While it is appropriate 
and practical to design countermeasures engineered to match the circumstances in which rear-
end collisions frequently occur, the frequency statistics alone do not establish what 
characteristics of the driving situation affect a driver’s performance to increase the risk of a rear-
end collision.   
This paper takes a closer look at the role of ambient light in fatal rear-end collisions by analyzing 
the distribution of these crashes across the annual Daylight Saving Time (DST) transitions. The 
technique inspected the change in the distribution of fatal crashes during periods just before and 
just after DST changeovers at times of day that transition from darkness to daylight and vice 
versa. In comparing crash data from a one-hour clock window across the DST transition, we 
assumed that levels of many factors known to play a role in fatal crashes remain relatively 
constant, leaving ambient light level as a quasi-independent variable. For example, in the Detroit 
area, the one-hour period between 19:30 h and 20:30 h is dark before the spring changeover to 
DST, and light afterwards. An important assumption in this analysis is that traffic conditions 
(and hence, crash opportunities) are the same in the weeks immediately before and after the 
changeover to and from DST, as traffic is principally governed by clock time rather than by the 
position of the sun in the sky. Observed differences in crash levels between these two periods are 
thus likely to be related to the difference in ambient light level, and may be used to quantify the 
effect of light in fatal crashes. 
Past analyses of increased crash risk in the dark have focused primarily on fatal pedestrian 
crashes, which are about four times more likely in the dark than in daylight (Sullivan & 
Flannagan, 2002a, 2002b). A small, but reliable, heightened risk was also observed in these 
analyses for fatal crashes between motor vehicles (1.3 times more likely in the dark). In the 
current analysis, we follow up this finding by examining changes in the patterns of collisions 
between motor vehicles with special focus on disaggregating the crashes by collision type and 
with particular interest in rear-end collisions. Although environmental factors have been causally 
linked to only small numbers of rear-end crashes, they may nevertheless play a role in elevating 
the risk of rear-end crashes as long as factors related to crash opportunity are similar.   
 
METHOD 
 
Crash data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) of the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) were selected from the 15-year period from 1987 to 
2001. Cases selected for analysis straddled the daylight saving time changeover periods in time 
windows that abruptly changed from dark to light (or light to dark) across the time change. To 
perform the DST analysis, the exact start and end of civil twilight was computed for the dates of 
the spring and fall adjustments for DST for each county in the continental United States, for each 
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of the 15 years covered in this analysis. Counties in states that do not observe DST, as well as 
counties split across time zones, were excluded. 
Using the county times for the start and end of civil twilight, crash-record clock times were 
recoded to indicate if the crash occurred in the one-hour interval just after the end of civil 
twilight, in the evening. As shown in Figure 1, in the spring, this interval is dark before DST and 
light (or twilight) after the DST changeover. In the fall, the interval is light before the DST 
changeover, and dark following it. For the present analysis, crash records were taken from five 
weeks before and five weeks after the evening transitions in both the spring and fall, and tagged 
as falling into either a light or a dark period. Morning data were excluded from this analysis 
because ambient light fluctuates over the five-week morning intervals before and after the 
changeovers. 
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Figure 1. Daylight saving time changeover characteristics for spring and fall. The solid line 
is the clock time of the start (top) and end (bottom) of civil twilight throughout the year for the 
Ann Arbor/Detroit area (1997).  
The magnitude of the risk was estimated by examining the ratio of crashes occurring during the 
dark period to those occurring during the light period.  A simple null hypothesis would suggest 
that a crash is equally likely to occur in either the dark or light period, and should produce a 
dark-light ratio of one. A ratio greater than one indicates an increased risk in darkness; a ratio 
less than one indicates reduced risk in darkness. 
In the first analysis, rear-end, front-end, and side-impact crashes involving two vehicles were 
compiled across the DST transitions. A further analysis was then conducted to examine the 
characteristics of rear-end collision risk as a function of vehicle role (striking, struck) and vehicle 
type (light vehicle, truck). 
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RESULTS 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the raw crash counts for each collision type across the one-hour evening time 
interval that changes from light to dark during the fall transition to standard time. The data are 
accumulated over 15 years (1987 to 2001) and show crash rates five weeks before and after the 
transition. Rear-end collisions change from an average rate of about 13 crashes in the light to an 
average of 37 in the dark, suggesting a dark-to-light crash ratio of about 3 to 1. For the remaining 
analyses, ratios are computed by pooling crash counts for spring and fall during the five-week 
dark and five-week light intervals before and after the transitions. Table 1 provides a breakdown 
of crash counts in dark and light for each crash type.   
 
Overall, fatal rear-end collisions were less frequent than either side-impact collisions or front-
end collisions, although they appeared to be more than twice as frequent in darkness as in 
daylight, suggesting that ambient light level may indeed play some role in affecting the 
likelihood of rear-end collisions.   
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Figure 1. Crash counts in the weeks prior to and following the fall evening return to 
standard time. The right half of the figure shows crashes occurring during a one-hour time 
interval that is in daylight prior to the transition to standard time; the right half shows crashes in 
darkness. 
 
Table 1. Accumulated crashes (and percent) in the dark and light intervals 5 weeks before 
and after the evening DST transition combined for both spring and fall  
 Ambient Light 
Crash Type Dark Light 
Dark/Light 
Ratio 
Rear-End 289 (70%) 123 (30%) 2.35 
Side-Impact 1099 (52%) 1008 (48%) 1.09 
Front-End 785 (55%) 649 (45%) 1.21 
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In the next analysis, we examined the relationship between vehicle type (light vehicle or truck) 
and the role (striking or struck) played by each vehicle in the crash. Vehicle type categories were 
defined using the same scheme applied in previous rear-end collision analyses (Wiacek & Najm, 
1999): the category light vehicles included automobiles, light trucks, SUVs, and vans; the 
category trucks included medium and heavy trucks. Because of the small number of fatal bus and 
motorcycles crashes, they were not included in this analysis.  
The breakdown of fatal crashes is shown in Figure 3. While fatal rear-end collisions involving 
striking light vehicles are three times more likely in the dark, there appears to be little difference 
in the striking-truck frequency during the dark and light periods. Especially noteworthy is that 
medium and heavy trucks appear to be over eight times as likely to be rear-ended in darkness as 
in daylight. This suggests that trucks are either more often unnoticed or somehow misperceived 
by drivers in darkness, leading to fatal collisions. That trucks are overrepresented as struck 
vehicles in nighttime crashes has been reported before (Green, Kubaki, Olson, & Sivak, 1979), 
and this has prompted regulatory action in the last 10 years to make trucks more conspicuous, 
with some effect (Morgan, 2001). 
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Figure 3. Fatal rear-end collisions during the spring and fall evening DST changeover 
period by vehicle type (light vehicle or truck) and role (striking or struck) in collision. The 
data were accumulated over 15 years for five-week periods before and after each changeover.  
CONCLUSION 
The relative risk of a fatal rear-end collision in darkness appears to be more than twice that in 
daylight. Although the added risk in darkness is substantial, it has perhaps been unnoticed until 
now because the volume of roadway encounters with stopped vehicles is far smaller in darkness 
than compared to that in daylight. We note that the discovery of such an environmental influence 
on fatal rear-end crash risk does not diminish the importance of attentional mechanisms in rear-
end collisions—in fact, allocation and reallocation of visual attention is likely influenced by 
target visibility. For example, detection of a looming object in the visual periphery is perhaps 
easier in daylight, permitting successful avoidance of a rear-end collision. Alternatively, perhaps 
with the reduced visibility of a forward vehicle, drivers are less compelled to keep their attention 
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on the road. In any case, the results suggest that some degree of fatal rear-end crash mitigation 
might be possible if target visibility is enhanced. 
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